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Abstract

This paper deals with the externalities associated with the individual developing country’s cost
of credit and borrowing level. As long as the supply curve o f credit is positively sloped, the
interest rate charged on credit extended to a particular developing country is affected by the
aggregate borrowing level of the rest of the countries. Moreover, the relatively high level of
indebtedness of big developing countries and their problems to service their external debts,
might adversely affect the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their
financial credibility. The estimation of the interest rate equations confirms the significant role of
these externalities in explaining the cost of credit to individual countries in the three distinct
developing regions of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. Furthermore,
since the individual country's information about the borrowing of the other debtor countries is
not perfect, this country perceives the interest rate on loans taken as a random variable, and
hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. The implications of this type of
externality on the borrowing behaviour of developing countries are analyzed within the context
of a stochastic framework in which countries borrowing large amount of money behave like
Stackelberg leaders. The estimation o f the derived borrowing equations are found to be
statistically significant in the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific.

*The author is a member of the Department of Economics at Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel,
and the Department of Economics at The University o f Wollongong, Wollongong, New South Wales 2500,
Australia. The author is grateful to Mark Freeman for a meticulous research assistantship in data collection and
statistical analysis.

1.

INT R O D U C T IO N
W hile capital accumulation, per-capita income, and income inequality were the

predominant issues o f development economics in the post-world war II era, it is the
external debts o f the less developed countries that have captured the attention of
development economists as well as the attention of main stream economists in the last
decade. During the 1970's and the 1980's the aggregate indebtedness of developing
countries grew very rapidly leading to a heightened concern about their ability to repay
their debts. The growing debts also led to an increase in income inequality and poverty
levels caused by the cuts in subsidies and wages prescribed by debt-relief programmes.
According to Berg and Sachs' (1988) estimation results, this increase in the income
inequality and poverty levels might raise the probability of insolvency and the need for
debt rescheduling and discount; and hence intensifies the already mounting tension
between the developing countries and the industrialized countries even further.
Furthermore, the large external debts accumulated by the LDCs tended further to
adversely affect their growth prospects. Thus, Krugman (1989) and Sachs (1988, 1989)
argue that high governmental debt-service payments require high tax rates that discourage
capital formation and repatriation of flight capital. Similarly, Dornbusch (1988) argues
that the fact that the government is the the main maker of debt-service payments in most
of the heavily indebted countries moderates the improving effect of devaluation on the
trade balance. The underlying reason is that a devaluation raises the domestic-currency
costs of servicing the foreign-currency debt. Thus in turn, increases the budget deficit,
raises the inflation rate, and reduces the competitiveness of the country's export. As a
result, most of the LDCs have seen their growth rates slow, and many have seen living
standards that were often already pitifully low fall even further.
The major sources of continuous and rapid accumulation of external debts by the
LDCs are: (1) inefficient allocation of resources stemming from inward- looking trade
policy supported by tariffs and licences; (2) domestic instability and inflation; (3) the
dramatic increase of oil prices in the 1970s followed by the rapid decline of these prices in
the 1980s; and (4) the rise of the inflation rate in the U.S. and Western Europe in the

early 1980s, that led to a hike of the interest rate. The present paper is concerned with the
externalities affecting the later factor.
In addition to the inflation in the creditors’ countires, the interest rate charged on
the individual developing country's liabilities might also reflect this country's financial
position in the credit market. However, there might be other factors, that are external to
the individual developing country, affecting the cost of credit and providing further
explanation of the rapid growth of the country's level of indebtedness. As long as the
supply curve of credit is positively sloped, the interest rate charged on credit extended to a
particular country should be affected by the aggregate borrowing level of the rest of the
countries. M oreover, the relatively high level of indebtedness of large developing
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico in Latin America and Nigeria and Zaire in SubSaharan Africa, and their problems to service their external debts, might adversely affect
the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their financial credibility.
The purpose of this paper is to explore, test, and quantify the effects of the
aforementioned external factors on the cost of credit for the individual developing country
and its level of borrowing. The assessment of the role of these external factors is carried
out in the following sections. Section 2 presents a statistical summary of the external
debt, external debt burden, and interest rate for three developing regions — Latin
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific—in the period 1975-1986. Section 2 also
compares the time trajectories of the interest rate and tests whether the differences in
interest rates charged on credit extended to these regions are statistically significant.
Confirmation of this hypothesis might indicate the existence of fundamental differences
among the three developing regions with regard to access to credit suppliers and level of
indebtedness and hence support the classification of the developing countries by regional
affiliation. Section 3 takes into account credit-supply's considerations, and estimates the
external effects of the regions' level of indebtedness and borrowing on the interest rate
charged on credit extended to each individual country.
Furthermore, since the individual country does not have full information about the
borrowing of its counterpart debtors, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken as a
random variable, and hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. Section 4

analyzes the implications of this type of externality, as well as the implications of the
aforem entioned externalities associated with the cost of credit, on the borrowing
behaviour of developing countries within the context of a stochastic framework, in which
countries borrowing large amounts of money behave like Stackelberg leaders —
maximizes expected utility from consumption subject to their resource constraint while
taking into account the reaction of the following smaller borrowing countries. The
parameters of the resultant Stackleberg equilibrium borrowing equations for leading and
following developing countries are estimated for each region, and the existence of
external effects on their borrowing behaviours is tested in Section 5.
Finally, a conceptual analysis of a jointly co-ordinated credit system, which takes
into account global welfare considerations as well as the individual country's welfare, and
which is capable of moderating the potential adverse effects o f the aforementioned
externalities, is briefly described in Section 6.

2.

T H E BURDEN O F T H E EX T ER N A L D EBT AND IN T E R E ST
RATES
Developing countries are often affiliated to regional reference groups such as Latin

America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. The underlying rationale is that greater
geographical affinity facilitates transfer of both positive and negative externalities between
countries. It is therefore possible that the well-being of an individual country is affected
by the overall performances of its reference group.
A statistical summary of the aggregate level of indebtedness of the aforementioned
regional groups and the interest rates paid on their external liabilities is given in Table 1
below for the priod 1975-1986 that encompases the aftermath of the first oil shock, the
second oil shock, the oil glut and the fall of the oil prices, and the rise of the interest rates.
This table presents the evolution of the absolute external debt level (in billions of 1985
U.S. Dollars) of each regional group as a whole (ZD), as well as the proportions of these
levels of external debts of the regional groups' aggregate output (d) which can be viewed
as indicators of the regional groups' average abilities to service their debts. The average
annual real interest rates (r) are proxied by the ratios of interest payments (public plus

private) made by the regional groups during each year to the aggregate external debt levels
at the beginning of the year. It is important to note that in many incidences the actual
interest payments were smaller than the due ones. In these incidences, the ratio of interest
payments to external debt level understates the interest rates agreed upon. It is assumed
that such downward biased effective interest rates were a-priori expected by the creditors
and were incorporated into their decisions about the supply of credit to various countries.
Ta ble

1.

Th e total external debt (in Billio n s of U.S. 1985 dollars), a v e r a g e
debt burden, and a ve ra g e real interest rates for Latin Am erica ,
S u b -S a h a ra n Africa, and Asia-Pacific*

Latin A m eric a

Year

ID

d

1975

93.691

0.1497

1976

111.664

1977

S u b -S a h a ra n

r

Africa

A sia -P a cific

ID

d

r

ID

d

r

0.0618

25.203

0.2698

0.0299

57.567

0.1587

0.0242

0.1531

0.0658

28.052

0.3065

0.0266

62.436

0.1732

0.0276

129.187

0.1537

0.0569

31.309

0.3193

0.0281

67.597

0.1741

0.0298

1978

155.800

0.2080

0.0657

37.161

0.2674

0.0278

71.193

0.1746

0.0316

1979

168.957

0.2062

0.0821

41.259

0.3084

0.0328

68.568

0.1668

0.0404

1980

171.044

0.1888

0.1027

43.930

0.3011

0.0445

72.835

0.1623

0.0398

1981

182.673

0.1892

0.1039

45.930

0.3429

0.0371

74.053

0.1643

0.0404

1982

194.586

0.2451

0.1079

47.970

0.3843

0.0364

83.130

0.1858

0.0407

1983

240.062

0.3486

0.0899

52.006

0.4456

0.0356

91.839

0.2128

0.0410

1984

259.680

0.4045

0.0819

50.152

0.5539

0.0413

95.168

0.2285

0.0434

1985

270.968

0.4252

0.0865

55.294

0.6157

0.0390

109.004

0.2598

0.0404

1986

288.880

0.0745

67.539

0.0201

99.513

0.0415

Average r

0.0816

0.0333

0.0367

Stand. Dev. r

0.0165

0.0067

0.0062

*The three reference groups include the following countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, M exico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, and Venezuela in Latin
America; Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leona, Somalia, Sudan,Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zaire in Sub-Saharan Africa; and Burma,Fiji, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua-New Gineau, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in Asia-Pacific.
The computations o f Z D , d, and r are based on these countries’ external debts, GNP, and interest
payments published in the World Debt Tables. External Debts of Developing Countries, volumes I, II and
III, The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA.

Table 1 reveals that the external debts and debt burden of the three regional groups
increased substantially during the inspected period. On the average the Latin American
countries had larger external debts than the Asia-Pacificn and African countries. The Latin
American and African groups’ debt-burden indices rose dramatically during the 1980s
due to the increase in the absolute level of indebtedness as well as to the decline in the
aggregate product. In contrast, the Asia-Pacific’s debt burden rose very moderately due
to a lower rate of increase in the absolute level of indebtedness and a lower rate o f decline
in the aggregate product. While the interest rate on credit extended
to the Latin American countries rose substantially and steadily to a peak o f 10.79 percent
in 1982, it varied very moderately for the Sub-Saharan African and Asia-Pacificn
countries. Furthermore, the average annual real interest rate for the Latin American group
was substantially higher than that of the other reference groups. During the inspected
period, the average annual real interest rate differentials between the Latin American
group and the Sub-Saharan African and Asia-Pacificn groups were 4.83 percent and 4.49
percent, respectively. These differentials are statistically significant at the 5 percent level
of confidence. The statistical test reveals further that the interest rate differential between
the Asia-Pacificn group and the Sub-Saharan African group is insignificant. These
interest rate differentials suggest that there are fundamental differences among the three
developing regions with regard to access to credit suppliers and level o f indebtedness,
and hence support the classification of the developing countries by regional affiliation.
3.

EX TER N A LITIES, CREDIT SUPPLY'S C O N SID ER A TIO N S, AND
THE ESTIM ATION OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION
Under the assumption that a greater geographical affinity tends to facilitate the

transfer of both positive and negative externalities between countries, it seems reasonable
to hypothesize that the cost of credit for any country might be directly related to the
current borrowing and initial levels of indebtedness of the group of countries with which
it is associated, as well as to its own current borrowing and initial level of indebtedness.
There are two ways by which developing countries belonging to a common regional
group inflict such external effects on one another:

1.

Given that the credit supply curve is positively sloped, the greater the group's
aggregate borrowing, the higher the cost of credit to the individual country.

2.

The greater the indebtedness level of the rest of the countries, the greater their
incentive to repudiate and hence the lower the expected debt repayment. The
decrease in the group's overall credibility leads creditors to charge higher interest
rates on new loans extended to the country in order to accommodate the excessive
risk.

In view of the aforementioned externalities and credit supply's considerations, it
is suggested that the average interest rate (r) charged on the i-th country's borrowing at
period t can be expressed in mathematical notations by the following ad-hock equation:
j
ri = r L Di t .j + r2

N
N
X D jj.j + r3 Bit + r4 X Bjt
j* i
j* i J

(1)

where, j= l,...,N denotes the countries belonging to the regional group which the i-th
country is affiliated to;

and Djt.j are the i-th and the j-th countries' external debts at

the end of the previous period, respectively; Bit is the i-th country's borrowing at period
t; Bjt is the j-th country's borrowing at period t; and r 1,r2,r3, and r4 are parameters
representing the effects of these factors, respectively, on the i-th country's assessment of
the average cost of its new borrowing.
The purpose of this section is to estimate the unknown parameters of equation 1 in
order to provide a preliminary assessment of the external effect of the regional reference
group's aggregate level of indebtedness and borrowing on the cost of credit for the
individual country member. The estimation of the interest rate equation is carried out with
annual observations on countries listed in Table 1 and classified to the aforementioned
regional groups for the period 1975 - 1986.

All of the explanatory variables are

expressed in millions of 1985 U.S. dollars. The estimation results are summarized in
Table 2. An alternative specification of the interest-rate equation, in which the debt-

product ratios o f the regional group and the individual country replace the respective
absolute levels of debts, leads to significantly less satisfactory estimation results.
Ta ble

2.

T h e e s t im a t e d in tere st rate e q u a tio n ; c o e f f i c i e n t s
A m eric a , Sub -S aharan Africa and Asia-Pacific*

fo r

La tin

E stim ated p aram eters for three reference g r o u p s
E x p la n a to ry
v a ria b le s

Latin

A m e ric a

S u b -S a h a ra n

A frica

A s ia -P a c ific

0.9991398E-06
(6.579)

0.4317022E-05
(5.476)

0.1771181E-06
(0.764)

0.2764420E-06
(14.038)

0.6253893E-06
(10.898)

0.5774115E-06
(15.470)

Bi

-0.8877093E-06
(0.784)

-0.4906530E-05
(1.954)

0.3498145-05
(1.474)

N
I B;
J>1

0.4149293E-06
(2.405)

-0.274907 8E-06
(0.657)

0.2003761E-06
(0.498)

0.250

0.017

0.022

293.201

138.354

121.854

260

314

122

Dj

1

N

N 'l j l

R2
F-test
d.f.

*The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.

As indicated by the F-test values, the estimation results of the interest rate
equation's parameters as a whole are statistically significant for the three regional groups
of developing countries.

Most particularly, the t-ratios show that for all of the three

regional groups the initial level of indebtedness of a country as well as the initial level of
indebtedness of the regional group to which the country is affiliated have, as expected,
significant positive effects on the interest rate on that country's current borrowing. Only
in the case of Asia-Pacific this effect of the individual country's level of indebtedness is
statistically insignificant. M oreover, in the case o f Asia-Pacific, the effect o f an
infinitesimal increase in the affiliation group's level of indebtedness on the interest rate on

the individual country's liabilities exceeds the effect of an infinitesimal increase in that
country's own liabilities. If the likelihood of repudiation increases with the level of
indebtedness, these findings imply that an increase in the level o f indebtedness of a
country and/or an increase in the level of indebtedness of the rest of the
countries affiliated to the same regional group reduce that country's reputation in the
credit market and hence raise the cost of its current borrowing.
A further indication of negative external effects among countries belonging to a
regional group is that in the case of Latin America the aggregate current borrowing level
of the rest of the countries significantly increases the cost of credit for the individual
country member. The existence of this source of external effect was not confirmed for
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific. A possible explanation to this variation in the
estimation results is that, due to their low levels of per-capita income, a major part o f the
African and Asia-Pacificn countries' credit is provided by non-profit international funds,
whereas the medium-income countries of Latin America rely more heavily on credit
supplied by commercial banks. This distinction may also explain the significantly
negative effect of the country's current borrowing on the interest rate for sub-Saharan
African countries. The existence of structural differences in the credit supply across the
three regional groups is indicated further by Chow tests.

4.

U N C E R T A IN T Y , R ISK A V E R SIO N , AND TH E BO R R O W IN G
BEHAVIOUR OF LDCs IN A STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
While the previous section's empirical ad-hock analysis of the supply of credit

lends support to the hypothesis that the greater the reference group's aggregate borrowing
and level of indebtedness, the higher the cost credit to the individual country; this section
considers the implications of these external factors with a broader and more elaborate
fram ework that also takes into account credit-dem and's considerations.

In this

framework, each individual country maximizes expected utility from consumption and
investment and takes into account the external effect inflicted by the rest of the countries'
financial position and borrowing behaviour on its consumption possibilities. Moreover, it
is assumed that the individual country does not have full information about the borrowing

of its counterpart debtor countries. Instead, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken
during the present period as a random variable, and thus might suffer from substantial
costs of risk bearing.
The following analysis is based on the assumption that the i-th country forms its
expectations about the interest rate (n te) rationally by incorporating the credit-supply's
considerations according to equation 1 and its assessment of the borrowing level of the
rest of the countries. It is postulated that the i-th country's borrowing at t is chosen to
maximize the country's (or the representative agent’s) expected utility from private
consumption and investment and government spendings (C) subject to its perceived
resource constraint:

Cjt = a i Bityit + NIMit - RPMjt - IPLjt - rjte Bjr

(2)

In this formulation y; denotes the average productivity of a borrowed dollar
directed to a production activity, and a,j is the proportion of the borrowing abroad serves
to finance domestic production activities. The rest, (1 - otj)Bit, helps to finance the net
import of consumption and investment goods (NIM), repayments of principal that
matured (RPM), interest payments on liabilities accumulated previously (IPL) and on
current borrowing.
The model refers to two Sub-groups o f countries in a given reference group
distinguished by the scale of their borrowing abroad — the big borrowers vis-a-vis the
smaller borrowers. In which case it seems reasonable to say that the Sub-group of the big
borrowers is behaving as a leader (L) in a Stackelberg setting and the Sub-group of the
smaller borrowers is behaving as a follower (F). The Stackelberg equilibrium is found by
computing the follower's reaction to a given borrowing level of the leader. This reaction
is incorporated, in turn, into the leader's decision about the optimal borrowing level.
The computation of the follower's reaction function assumes that the follower
does not have full information about the leader's borrowing level, but that the follower's
expectations about the leader's borrowing level are unbiased and normally distributed
with finite variances <J2Lt:

BLte ~

N(BLt, o2Lt).

(3)

This assumption and equations 1 and 2 imply that the follower's private and public
consumption and investment (CFt) is normally distributed with mean and variance equal

E(Cpt) = 0Cp Bpt yFt + NIMpt - RPMFt - IPLpt
- [ r l D p t - l + r2 D L t-l + r3 B Ft + r4 BLt]BFt

VAR(Cpt) = / G 2 B 2 .
ri

4

Lt

Ft

(4)

(5)

A ssuming for tractability that the follower's preferences over CFt can be
represented by a negative exponential utility function reflecting constant absolute risk
aversion, the follower's current borrowing is found by maximizing the difference
between the mean of CFt and the costs of risk-bearing that are equal to half the product of
the variance of CFt and the follower's degree of absolute risk aversion (RF):
max [E(CFt) - 0.5RF VAR (CFt)]
Bpt

(6)

(See Freund, 1956, for a rigourous development of the mean-variance expected utility
function, and Hammond, 1974, and Meyer, 1987, for a discussion of the generality of
this framework.)
The first-order condition for maximum implies that the expected increase in the
Follower's private and public consumption and investment from an additional dollar
borrowed abroad (i.e., the marginal product of credit minus the marginal interest payment
on credit) is offset by the increase in its costs of risk bearing stemming from the
uncertainty about the leader's borrowing lev el:

a F yFt " [r l D Ft-l + r2D L t-l + 2r3 B Ft + r4 B l J “ R Fr4 ° L t B F f

The second-order condition for maximum
-2r3 - Rpr^ (JLt < 0

(8)

is satisfied as long as the marginal costs of credit for the follower are increasing.
The necessary condition for maximum implies that the reaction of the follower's
borrowing to the leader's borrowing is given by:

B Ft = P (a FyF - r i D F t - l' r2D Lt-l ‘ r4B Lt)

(9)

(3 = l/(2r3 + RFr42o 2t)

(10)

where

is by the second-order condition for maximum a positive term. Equations 9 and 10 imply
that for any given leader's borrowing level, the follower's demand for credit is equal to
the difference between the marginal product of a dollar borrowed abroad and the marginal
cost stemming from the follwer's and leader's initial levels o f indebtedness and the
leader's current borrowing, divided by twice the marginal cost stemming from the
follower's own borrowing and risk bearing.
The com putation o f the leader's borrowing level assumes that the leader
maximizes utility from private and public consumption and investment subject to the
follower's reaction function specified above. Given that the parameters of the follower's
reaction function and the follower's initial level of indebtedness are known to the leader,
the leader's costs o f risk bearing are nil. This implies in turn that, in view of the meanvariance expected utility specification and equations 1, 2 and 9, the leader's decision
problem can be rendered as:

max {aL BLt yLt + MINLt - RPMLt - IPLU
B li
' tr l D L t - l + r 2 D F t- l + r3 B L t + r 4 P ( a F >"Ft ' r l D F t - l ‘ r2D L t - l " r4 B L t^ B Lt^ ' ^ ^

The resultant necessary condition for maximum implies that the leader's borrowing in a
Stackelberg equilibrium (BLt*) is given by:

BLt* = 7t(a L yLt - r4 P a F yFt) - (r l ' r2 r4p) D Lt-l ' (r2 ' r l r4p) ° F t-lJ

( 12)

where
y = l/(2r3 - 2r42P).

(13)

Correspondingly, the follower's borrowing level in a Stackelberg equilibrium (Bpt*) is
found by substituting equation 12 for BLt in equation 9:

BFt*

= PO - r42PY)«FyFt - H PyaLyLt - Pt(ri - r2 r4 y + ri r42 Py)]Dfm
- p [( r2 -rir 4 Y + r2 r4 2 pY)]DLt-i

(14)

Equations 12 and 14 implies the following propositions about the leading and
following Sub-groups' borrowing behaviour in a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (the effect of Du-1 on Bn*):

dB u* > n
dD u-i < U

as

ri <
— =
r2 >

r4
-------------—
2r3 + Rp r42 aL t2

Proposition 1 implies that the likelihood that the leader's initial debt level deters its
borrowing at present:
a.

rises with the follower's costs o f risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty
about the leader's borrowing at present (R f o n 2),

b.

rises with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged on
its own borrowing at present (ri),

c.

declines with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate
charged on the leader's borrowing at present (r2) through a decline in the
credibility o f the reference group to which the leader and the follower are
affiliated.

Proposition 2 (the effect of Dpt-i on BLt*):

dSLt*
dDpt-i

> a
<
n

<

________r4_______

rl

>

2r3 + R f ^ 2 OLt2

Proposition 2 implies that the likelihood that the follower's initial debt level deters the
leader's borrowing at present:
a.

rises with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty
about the leader's borrowing at present (RpOLt2),

b.

declines with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged
on its own borrowing at present (ri),

c.

rises with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate charged
on the leader's borrowing at present (r2) through a decline in the credibility of the
reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.

Proposition 3 (the effect of Dpt-i on Bpt*): If y>0, then :

dBpt*
dDpt-i

db

>
< U
II
rl

>
—

r4(l-2r4)
2r3 + Rp r42 OLt

_ "T

2r3
t4

(A proof is provided in the Appendix.)

Proposition 3 implies that, given that y>0, the likelihood that the follower's initial debt
level deters its borrowing at present:
a.

declines with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty
about the leader's borrowing at present (R p a n 2), as long as r4<0.5,

b.

rises with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate charged
on its own borrowing at present (ri),

c.

declines with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged
on the follower's borrowing at present (12) through a decline in the credibility of
the reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.

Proposition 4 (the effect of D u -l on Bpt*): If 7>0, then

dBFt*
dDu-1
as

> n
<
a
r2

>
<

r4(l-2 r4)
2r3 + R pr42

+ 2r 3

Proposition 4 implies that, given that y>0, the likelihood that the leader's initial debt level
deters the follower's borrowing at present:
a.

declines with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty
about the leader's borrowing at present (RpCJLt2). as long as r4<0.5,

b.

declines with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate on its
own borrowing at present (ri),

c.

rises with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged on
the follower's borrowing at present fo ) through a decline in the credibility of the
reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.

Propositions 1 to 4 indicate that the leader's and follower's initial levels of
indebteness affect the leader's and follower's current borrowing levels in several ways
and directions, and hence their total effects are not clear a priori. It is important to note
that if y<0, the inequalities indicated by propositions 3 and 4 are reversed. However,
equations 10 and 13 indicate that the greater the followers' degree of absolute risk
aversion and level of uncertainty about the leaders borrowing level, the greater the
likelihood that y is positive.

5.

LEADERS AND FOLLOW ERS' ESTIM ATED BORROW ING
EQ U A TIO N S
The leaders and followers' borrowing equations developed above are estimated in

this section in order to quantify and test further the hypothesized financial
interdependencies between developing countries affiliated to a common reference group
summarized by propositions 1 to 4. The estimation utilizes annual observations on the
external debts and borrowing of developing countries in millions of U.S. dollars at 1985
prices for the period 1975 to 1986. The countries included in the empirical analysis are
classified according to regional affiliation into three general groups — Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. The data source and the countries affiliated to any
of these groups are indicated in the comment to Table 1. The leaders in each of the
regional groups are identified by their outstanding high level of annual borrowing: Brazil
and Mexico in Latin America; Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire in Sub-Saharan Africa; and India
and Indonesia in Asia-Pacific. The rest of the countries are classified as followers. The
estimation is performed with annual observations on the aggregate borrowing and initial
indebtedness levels o f the two types of countries in each of the regional groups. The
estimation results are obtained by the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure that minimizes
the sum of squares of the transformed residuals, and are summarized in Table 3.

T a b le

3.

E xplan ato ry

Th e e stim ated borrow ing e q u a tio n s c o e ffic ie n ts for le a d e rs and
fo llow e rs in Latin A m eric a , S u b -S a h a ra n Africa and A s ia -P a c ific
1975-1986*

variables

Latin America

S u b -S a h a r a n

A fric a

Asia-Pacific

Leaders' Borrowina Eauation
constant

463.5705
(0.124)

-999.55998
(0.402)

19341.38
(2.602)

The leaders' aggregate level of
indebtedness (D J

0.7994862
(3.361)

-0.06111733
(0.281)

-0.5722540
(2.412)

The followers ' aggregate level of
indebtedness (Dp)

0.6445407
(1.549)

0.1729466
(0.738)

0.1653956
(1.748)

0.964

0.163

0.319

681.6729

4.970476

2.926900

1.596

1.955

R2
F-test statistic
Durbin-Watson test statistic

1.736

Followers' Borrowina Eauation
constant

23272.287
(4.031)

3089.440
(0.847)

31261.98
(2.354)

The leaders' aggregate level of
indebtedness (DL)

-0.1244822
(2.895)

0.1127531
(0.390)

-0.8408428
(2.294)

The followers' aggregate level of
indebtedness (DF)

0.2554852
(3.494)

-0.1365340
(0.420)

0.1941243
(1.274)

0.461

0.135

0.226

51.54835

2.508637

2.356048

2.035

1.884

2.188

R2
F-test statistic
Durbin-Watson test statistic

‘ The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.

In general, the estim ation results of the leaders and followers' borrowing
equations are statistically significant in the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific, but
are not significant in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. The lack of statistically significant
estimation results in the later case is probably due to the fact that the predominant share of
credit to the African countries was provided by non-profit international funds. The
significant findings are as follows.
While the effect of the leading countries' absolute initial level of indebtedness on
their current annual borrowing is significantly positive in the case of Latin America, it is

significantly negative in the case of A sia-Pacific and detering further borrowing.
Recalling proposition 1, these findings might indicate that while the underlying factor "c"
dominates factors "a" and "b" in the former case, the underlying factors "a" and "b"
dominate factor "c" in the later.
In both the Latin American and Asia-Pacificn cases the effect of the following
countries aggregate initial level of indebtedness on the leading countries borrowing is
significantly positive. In view o f proposition 2, this finding might indicate that the
underlying factor "b" dominates the underlying factors "a" and "c".
In contrast, in both the Latin American and the Asia-Pacificn cases the leading
countries' aggregate level o f indebtedness significantly deter the following countries’
aggregate borrowing. Recalling proposition 4, this finding might indicate that the
underlying factor "c" dominates factors "a" and "b".
In both the Latin American and the Asia-Pacificn cases the following countries
initial aggregate level of indebtedness does not deter their current borrowing. Moreover,
in the case of Latin America, the following countries level of borrowing significantly
increases with their initial level of indebtedness. In view of proposition 3, this finding
might indicate that the underlying factors "a" and "c" dominate factor "b".

6.

G L O B A L W E L F A R E C O N SID E R A T IO N S
COORDINATED CREDIT SYSTEM

AND

A

JO IN T L Y

The adverse effects of the externalities described and assessed in the previous
sections on the global welfare level of the developing countries can be moderated by a
jointly coordinated borrowing.

The general fram ework of a jointly coordinated

borrowing is based on the maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson global welfare function
defined on the individual countries’ utilities from consumption, where each country’s
consum ption possibilities depend upon its borrowing level, and where the global
borrowing level is constrained:

max
W [Ul (C it), ..., U * (CNt)]
B u - BNt

subject to
Cjt — OCi

Yit

- [ri Dit-i + r 2

NIMit - RPMit - IPLit
J
N
N
YTT ^ Djt-1 + O Bit + r 4 I BjJ Bit
j* l
j*i
fit

for every i = 1,...,N, and
N
I Bjt = B.
j= l

(17)

The necessary condition for maximum global welfare implies

aw 0U1 r
aui

3 Q [«i yi - (n + r3 Bi)] = \i

(18)

for every country i = l , ..., N; where |i is the shadow value of the global credit constraint.
As can be seen from the necessary condition for maximum, such a coordinated credit
system leads to the following globaly desired properties:
1.

The net marginal benefits from extending credit to either country i=l,...,N ; i.e.,
the marginal product of credit minus the marginal factor cost of credit; are the
same in terms of global welfare units.

2.

The uncertainty about the borrowing levels of the rest of the countries and the
accompanying costs of risk bearing for the individual country are eliminated.
Although from a global welfare perspective there is a need for a higher degree of

co-ordination in view of the externalities existing in the credit market and the
segmentation of this market, the design and application of such co-ordination is very
difficult. The Bergson-Samuelson welfare function is nothing but a very general way to
describe global welfare and hence it is not much use in deciding what kind of ethical
judment might be reasonable in allocating credit to developing countries. This problem
is, of course, the major obstacle in establishing a jointly co-ordinated credit system.

7.

CONCLUDING REM ARKS
This paper was concerned with the potential transfer of externalities among highly

indebted developing countries that might affect the cost o f credit to the individual debtor
country. These externalities stem from the free-rider problem characteristic to price
pooling: as long as the supply curve of credit is positively sloped, the interest rate charged
on credit extended to a particular country is affected by the aggregate borrowing level of
the rest of the countries. Moreover, the relatively high level o f indebtedness of big
developing countries and their problems to service their external debts, might adversely
affect the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their financial
credibility. The estimation of the interest rate equations confirmed the significant role of
these externalities in explaining the cost of credit to individual countries in the three
distinct developing regions of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific.
This paper considered further the external effect on the individual country's cost
o f credit imposed by uncertainty about the rest of the countries' borrowing beaviour.
Since the individual country does not have full information about the borrowing of its
counterparts debtors, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken during the present period
as a random variable, and hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. The
implications of this type of externality on the borrowing beaviour of developing countries
were analyzed within the context of a stochastic Stackelberg-type model, in which big
borrowing countries maximizes expected utility from consumption subject to their
resource constraint while taking into account the reaction o f the following smaller
borrowing countries. The estimation results of the derived borrowing equations were
found to be statistically significant in the cases o f Latin America and Asia-Pacific. The
empirical findings indicate that in the Latin American and Asia-Pacific cases the initial
levels of indebtedness of the relatively small-borrowing countries raise the borrowing
levels of the big-borrowing countries. In contrast, the small-borrowing countries demand
for credit is deterred by the big-borrowing countries initial level of indebtedness. In
terms of the conceptual model, this small-borrowing countries reduced demand for credit
corresponds to the increase in the interest rate arising from the adverse effect of the bigborrowing countries initial level of indebtedness on the credibility of the regional group as

a whole. It is also aimed at lowering the small-borrowing countries costs of risk bearing
stemming from the uncertainty about the big-borrowing countries demand for credit.
This empirically indicated asymmetry reveals the role that the externalities inherent in the
international credit market play to the disadvantage of the small-borrowing developing
countries.

A PPE N D IX

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The differentiation of equation 14 with respect to Dpt-i implies

= -p(ri - r 2r4y + rir42(3y)

as

r42 J3y - r2r4 y/ri

|

|

0

= -1. And given that y>0,

0 as r4(r2/ri - r4(3)

|

1/(3.

By substituting equations 10 and 13 for P and y, respectively

dBFt*

> n

dD pn

< U

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4

Proof: The differentiation of equation 14 with respect to DLt-i implies

= 'P (r2 ' rir4 ^ + r2r24pY)

as

Given that y>0,

r42Py - rir4y/r2

= -1.

|

0

By substitution equations 10 and 13 for {3 and y, respectively,

> 0
< U

dBFt*
d D u -l

as

ri
>
r4( l- 2r24)
2r 3
— = ------—------ —— - + — —. QED
r2

< 2r3 + R p r24a L t2

r4
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